

Constitutional Rules and Redistributive Policy: Evidence from Global Agricultural Protection

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Abstract

The paper studies how electoral rules and forms of government shape agricultural policy across a large sample of developing and developed countries over the 1955-2005 period. Results from difference-in-difference and cross-country regressions give support to the idea that political institutions systematically affect agricultural protection. Democratic reform induces an increase in agricultural protection that is conditional to the country choice of the form of democracy. Indeed, what matters are reforms into proportional democracies (*vis-à-vis* majoritarian democracies) and, to a lesser extent, reforms into presidential democracies (*vis-à-vis* parliamentary democracies). Moreover, we show that the redistributive attitude of proportional democracy is not driven by the (left) ideology orientation of the governments.

Keywords: Electoral Rules; Forms of Government; Ideology; Agricultural Protection; Political Economics.

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